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INTRODUCTION
“In a society where people can dine at a restaurant named
‘Hooters,’ I am disturbed that a woman breastfeeding her child in
a mall is so offensive that a law to protect her right to do so had to be
established.”1 Yet such a law was in fact created. In an effort to pro-
tect the choices of mothers across the Commonwealth, Pennsylvania
enacted the Freedom to Breastfeed Act in July 2007.2 Breastfeeding
one’s own child is a natural human instinct,3 yet it is currently one
which, in the United States, seems to be unsupported and neglected
by mothers, families, and the public. In fact, “only [fifty-six] percent
1. Amy Williams Strasburg, Letter to the Editor, Pa. Breastfeeding Law Exposes
Double Standard, LANCASTER NEW ERA (Lancaster, Pa.), July 16, 2007, at A8.
2. Kim Lyons, Rendell Signs Bill to Allow Breast-feeding in Public, PITTSBURGH
TRIB.-REV., July 10, 2007, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/rss/s
_516583.html; see also 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 636.1-.4 (West 2009) (allowing a woman to
breastfeed in public).
3. Cf. SHERRY F. COLB, WHEN SEX COUNTS: MAKING BABIES AND MAKING LAW 73
(2007) (“In addition, [breastfeeding] does a lot to facilitate bonding between mother and
child.”); Edward Baer & Leah Marguiles, Infant and Young Child Feeding: An Analysis
of the WHO/UNICEF Meeting, STUD. IN FAM. PLAN., Feb. 1980, at 72, 72 (“Hundreds
of scientific studies confirm the superiority of breastfeeding for nutritional, immuno-
logical, economic, psychological, and contraceptive reasons.”); Sijke Selinda Barkhuis,
Note, Breast-feeding and the Law, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 417, 423 (1994) (“[B]reast-
feeding remains essential for the survival, proper psychological development, and health
of individual infants.”).
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of new mothers in this country breastfeed.” 4 Many women have
chosen, whether for personal preference or medical necessity, to
feed their new children infant formula, rather than the natural and
instinctive choice their own bodies may provide. While formula may
not be a significant public health threat in the United States, breast
milk offers a significant number of benefits that a mass-produced
formula cannot provide.5 Statistically, breast milk offers superior
nourishment to a growing infant6 “for nutritional, immunological,
economic, psychological, and contraceptive reasons.” 7 Studies have
also suggested that an infant fed a predominantly formula-based
diet is “more susceptible to a wide range of infectious diseases and
allergies than the breastfed child.” 8
Governments all over the world have concluded that the breast
is in fact the best option when it comes to feeding a very young infant
and have instituted numerous programs to encourage breastfeeding.9
David Satcher, the United States Surgeon General under President
Clinton, urged mothers to breastfeed and the United States govern-
ment to initiate “ ‘national, culturally appropriate strategies to pro-
mote breastfeeding.’ ”10 Satcher also called breastfeeding “ ‘one of the
most important contributors to infant health’ ” and classified the
United States’ low breastfeeding rates as a “ ‘public health chal-
lenge.’ ”11 In order to meet this public health challenge head-on and
increase the breastfeeding rate in America, the government and the
community must work together to accommodate mothers and infants
4. Charity R. Clark & Elizabeth R. Wohl, Breastfeeding Laws in Vermont: A Primer,
VT. B.J., Spring 2008, at 1.
5. George Kent, Child Feeding and Human Rights, INT’L BREASTFEEDING J., Dec. 18,
2006, available at http://www.internationalbreastfeedingjournal.com/content/1/1/27 (“Even
when it is produced and prepared properly, infant formula leads to inferior health out-
comes because it lacks some of the key elements in breast milk, especially the factors
that strengthen the infant’s immune system.”).
6. COLB, supra note 3, at 73.
7. Baer & Marguiles, supra note 3, at 72.
8. Id. (referencing a series of studies, carried out in “modern middle-class US and
European communities,” comparing the developments of breastfed children with children
who were fed primarily formula). See also COLB, supra note 3, at 73 (“Nursing provides
a baby with her mother’s immunity to pathogens, along with exactly the right mix of
nutrients needed for her to thrive. Breastfeeding also significantly reduces an infant’s
inevitable ingestion of air while she drinks and the consequent distress that bottle-
feeding frequently entails.”).
9. Danielle M. Shelton, When Private Goes Public: Legal Protection for Women Who
Breastfeed in Public and at Work, 14 LAW AND INEQ. 179, 185 (1995).
10. Jacqueline H. Wolf, What Feminists Can Do for Breastfeeding and What Breast-
feeding Can Do for Feminists, 31 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 397, 410 (2006)
(quoting DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE ON WOMEN’S HEALTH, HHS BLUEPRINT
FOR ACTION ON BREASTFEEDING 3 (2000), available at http://www.womenshealth.gov/
archive/breastfeeding/programs/blueprints/bluprntbk2.pdf [hereinafter HHS BLUEPRINT]).
11. Id. (quoting HHS BLUEPRINT, supra note 10).
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and support mothers’ efforts to breastfeed,12 especially since a suc-
cessful breastfeeding relationship relies on exclusive breastfeeding.13
A society that preaches “breast is best” and hails the benefits
of breastfeeding, yet does little to support breastfeeding mothers in
public places, will fail in its efforts to increase the breastfeeding rate.
By limiting via social stigma, rather than law, the accepted nursing
areas to private homes, mothers are forced either to become reclusive
members of society for as long as they breastfeed in order to main-
tain that exclusivity,14 or to supplement their children’s diets with
formula in an attempt to become socially acceptable and remain con-
tributing members of the public sphere.15 Many states have attempted
to overcome this inhibiting social stigma by enacting legislation to
clarify a mother’s right to breastfeed her child in public, but each
piece of legislation varies with regard to its language, enforcement,
and provided remedies.16
Pennsylvania passed its Freedom to Breastfeed Act in July 2007;17
the Act explicitly states the legislature’s recognition of the importance
of breastfeeding to family life.18 While Pennsylvania’s new law may on
its face appear to be a step in the right direction, it is only an empty
statement. The Pennsylvania legislature managed to imply public
support for a mother’s choice to breastfeed, while, in reality, it created
a toothless law. The Freedom to Breastfeed Act lacks creation of a
right to breastfeed, contains confusing language, lacks remedies a
mother can use to protect her personal choice, and stands only as
an empty attempt to placate a vocal portion of the constituency.
This Note argues that the Pennsylvania legislature’s ultimate
word choice and statutory construction greatly diminish the Act’s
protection of nursing mothers who wish to simultaneously do two
12. Barkhuis, supra note 3, at 423 (“Successful breast-feeding depends in large part
on social encouragement and accommodation. Since American culture fails to provide
much of either one, it is not surprising that breast-feeding rates in this country are low.”).
13. Id. at 436 (“Because successful lactation requires frequent and exclusive breast-
feeding on demand, prohibiting women from breast-feeding in certain places under-
mines their ability to breast-feed successfully and, thus, would burden their right to
breast-feed.”).
14. COLB, supra note 3, at 74. Colb further suggests that the forced choice between
reclusion or formula-feeding “has far greater implications — for women and for their
children — than does the decision about whether to expose one’s nipples for entertainment
value.” Id.
15. See Barkhuis, supra note 3, at 419 (“Faced with widespread intolerance of breast-
feeding, and vulnerable to the ignorance that such intolerance reflects, many new mothers
might be disinclined to initiate or continue breast-feeding.”).
16. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Breastfeeding Laws, http://www.ncsl
.org/default.aspx?tabid=14389 (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (providing an index of the
various state laws concerning public breastfeeding).
17. Lyons, supra note 2.
18. Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.2 (West 2009).
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legal things: make the choice to breastfeed their children and remain
contributing members of the public sphere. Part I reviews the various
rationales underlying the creation of breastfeeding protection legis-
lation in the United States. Part II highlights Pennsylvania’s attempt
to create breastfeeding protection legislation and discuss its immediate
implications. Part III presents suggested changes for the Freedom
to Breastfeed Act, using other states’ legislative choices as models
and examples. Finally, Part IV proposes that Pennsylvania adopt a
remedy clause in order to give the legislation more force.
I. A MOTHER’S CHOICE: BREASTFEEDING V. BOTTLE-FEEDING
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), seventy-four percent of children born in 2006 were initially
breastfed.19 By six months of age, only forty-three percent of children
were being breastfed at all, and only fourteen percent were exclusively
breastfed,20 though the CDC asserts that breastfeeding is “[i]deal for
[i]nfants” and that “[b]oth babies and mothers gain many benefits
from breastfeeding.” 21 There are a number of medical and personal
reasons why a mother would choose formula over her own breast milk.
Ultimately, however, societal pressures and personal beliefs tend to
play a significant role in mothers’ choices regarding breastfeeding.
Mothers may find themselves mixing formula rather than breast-
feeding their child and bonding in a more elemental way22 because
of hurdles like misinformation propagated by the infant formula in-
dustry, a denial of adequate maternity leave by her employer, and
insufficient support from her own doctor.23 Some feel a certain sense
of culturally encouraged modesty due to worries about a perceived
lack of decorum surrounding breastfeeding or indelible links to the
sexuality of the breast that lead them to decline to breastfeed.24
“Other women may choose not to breastfeed because of embedded cul-
tural assumptions about the propriety of breastfeeding, the sexual
19. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Breastfeeding Among U.S. Children
Born 1999-2006, CDC National Immunization Survey, http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/
data/NIS_data/index.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
20. Id.
21. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Breastfeeding, http://www.cdc.gov/
breastfeeding/index.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
22. COLB, supra note 3, at 73.
23. Isabelle Schallreuter Olson, Comment, Out of the Mouths of Babes: No Mother’s
Milk for U.S. Children — The Law and Breastfeeding, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 269, 299
(1995); see also KAREN M. KEDROWSKI & MICHAEL E. LIPSCOMB, BREASTFEEDING RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (2008) (“Some women are less likely to breastfeed because of
operative assumptions and biases within the medical community that continues, for the
most part, to play a supervisory role over the delivery and care of infants.”).
24. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 23, at 33.
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nature of the breast, and about norms of what constitutes the proper
space and body required for feeding one’s child.” 25 An even more fre-
quently encountered and disturbing barrier to the natural choice of
breastfeeding is the social stigma and denial of public support many
mothers face. One author describes her experiences breastfeeding her
third child: “[b]eing stuck at home breast-feeding as he [the author’s
husband] walked out the door for work just made me unreasonably
furious, at him and everyone else.” 26 Why should a woman be “stuck
at home,” cut off from the community, just because she has made the
choice to breastfeed? A woman’s choice to breastfeed or to formula-
feed should be supported; that support requires a public sphere accept-
ing of both choices outside the home.
Stories abound of breastfeeding mothers being relegated to public
restrooms with their infants,27 or even being removed from public
areas because of their choice to breastfeed, an act which must often
occur outside the home due to its very nature.28 Breastfeeding women
are often met with outright hostility from the very society that should
be supporting their choice to breastfeed.29
Society’s opinions regarding breastfeeding seem almost contra-
dictory. Women are strongly encouraged to breastfeed by the scientific
community30 and local, national, and international organizations,31
yet, at the same time, society may reject a woman attempting to pro-
vide what she thinks is the best nutrition for her child because she
happens to be out in public while doing it. Much of this hostile re-
jection of a natural, extraordinarily nutritious act appears to stem
25. Id.
26. Hanna Rosin, The Case Against Breast-Feeding, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2009,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/04/the-case-against-breastfeeding/7311.
27. Virginia L. Marchant, Are Your Breasts Bound by Law?, MOTHERING, Jan. 2005,
at 62, 64.
28. See Durmeriss Cruver-Smith, Note, Protecting Public Breast-Feeding in Theory
But Not in Practice, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 167, 172 (1998) (“Infants do not have time
clocks, making it impossible for mothers to arrange in advance to nurse their children
in private accommodations. . . . ‘[U]nless mother and child are to be imprisoned in the
home for the three to twelve months during which nursing i[s] desirable, it is likely that
the mother will be forced either to endure the hunger shrieks of her infant or more
properly to feed it wherever she is.’ ” (quoting Arthur D. Silk, Breast-Feeding Should be
Encouraged, Not Outlawed, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1995, at B11)).
29. See COLB, supra note 3, at 73 (“In the United States and elsewhere, women who
breastfeed outside the house must often be prepared to face hostility.”); Shelton, supra
note 9, at 181 (“It seems no breastfeeding woman is immune from potential attacks by
employers, police officers, quasi-public property owners, other citizens, and security
guards.”).
30. Cruver-Smith, supra note 28, at 171 (discussing the results of scientific studies
analyzing the benefits of breastfeeding).
31. See, e.g., La Leche League International, http://www.llli.org (last visited Mar. 29,
2010) (a national and international breastfeeding support coalition).
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from the perception of a woman’s breast as a sexual object, though
it serves an entirely different purpose while she is nursing.32 Others
have suggested that hostility to public breastfeeding stems from a
perception that it is unprofessional for a woman, especially an em-
ployed woman, to breastfeed her child and continue to maintain a
professional presence.33 Some contend that breastfeeding is “trivial
and mundane,” 34 perhaps because infant formula is so easily avail-
able and relatively safe,35 or that a breastfeeding woman is merely
seeking attention or participating in a “form of exhibitionism,” be-
cause breastfeeding is thought of as an “ ‘embarrassing, unnecessary,
[and] disgusting’ ” act.36 A quarter of mothers responding to a sur-
vey shared that they chose to bottle-feed their children because they
felt breastfeeding to be “embarrassing.” 37 Some low-income women,
responding to the same survey, reported that they chose not to breast-
feed because they “perceived a negative reaction from those who wit-
nessed” breastfeeding in public.38 Some teenage mothers said their
concern for their own body image led them to choose to bottle-feed
their children.39 Similar surveys link an attitude against public breast-
feeding to “breasts’ sexual connotation in American society, includ-
ing their use for male sexual pleasure or fantasy.” 40 One woman has
even reported that, though she was physically able to breastfeed and
had no employment obligations to stand in her way, she chose not
to breastfeed because it “would set up an unequal dynamic in her
marriage — one in which the mother, who was responsible for the
very sustenance of the infant, would naturally become responsible
for everything else as well.” 41 All of these factors may have played
32. Olson, supra note 23, at 275; see also COLB, supra note 3, at 74 (“Society today
views women’s breasts as presumptively sexual and accordingly dirty and taboo.”).
33. Shelton, supra note 9, at 186.
34. Id. at 184.
35. See Barkhuis, supra note 3, at 419 (“Although the recent introduction of artificial
infant food may now ensure the survival of the human species without breast-feeding,
breast-feeding remains essential for the survival, proper physiological development, and
health of individual infants.”).
36. Shelton, supra note 9, at 183-84 (quoting Peter Pallot, Breastfeeding Women Are
Told to Leave, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 6, 1993, at 6). A recent survey suggests
that while many report that “they are not offended by public breastfeeding,” these same
people insist that the sight of a breastfeeding mother is only disagreeable when that
mother is feeding her infant immodestly. As many mothers know, however, “modesty
is sometimes difficult to maintain,” especially with an older baby. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB,
supra note 23, at 45.
37. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 23, at 37.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 36; see also Shelton, supra note 9, at 179 (“Breastfeeding is perceived by
many as dirty, sexual, embarrassing, and generally something that should be kept behind
closed doors.”).
41. Rosin, supra note 26.
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a part in the recently reported experiences of two women, both of
whom made the dual decisions to breastfeed their infants and main-
tain a social presence as they continued to patronize stores and travel
within society while they made sure their children’s nutritional needs
were met in a manner of their own choosing.
In July 2004, a Starbucks Coffee employee asked Lorig
Charkoudian, a Maryland mother, to relocate to the coffee shop’s
restroom or stop breastfeeding her daughter while uncovered in the
store’s seating area.42 Upon Charkoudian’s inquiry, Starbucks con-
firmed that though the company had no official policy regarding
breastfeeding, “breastfeeding fell into the category of behaviors that
might create complaints, and therefore employees could approach
nursing mothers and ask them to stop breastfeeding or leave the
main area of the store.” 43 Similarly, Maggie Buckwalter was chas-
tised in February 2007 for attempting to discreetly breastfeed her
infant son in the hallway of her daughters’ elementary school, where
she was volunteering.44 Buckwalter reported that a school adminis-
trator told her “it was inappropriate to breast-feed her baby in pub-
lic at the school.” 45 Both of these situations reflect the antagonism
breastfeeding mothers face when they choose to do what they feel
is best, and what has been demonstrated as the superior option for
their children, while simultaneously trying to maintain a public pres-
ence. “Given that breastfeeding is widely acknowledged as beneficial
for both babies and their mothers, it is disturbing that the facilita-
tion of this important process meets so much misunderstanding and
resistance.” 46 Fortunately, states have begun making significant
efforts to protect a woman’s choice to breastfeed and her ability to
do so while maintaining a public presence.
A. Breastfeeding and State Legislation
Many states have recently attempted to protect the breastfeeding
mother from the discrimination she may face when she chooses to
breastfeed her child in a public space. Though public breastfeeding
is not forbidden outright in any state,47 many state legislatures have
42. Marchant, supra note 27, at 67.
43. Id.
44. Margie Peterson, Moms Can Nurse Babies in Public — If Nobody Minds, MORNING
CALL (Allentown, Pa.), July 5, 2007, at B1.
45. Id. (Buckwalter stated that she “ ‘left school that day feeling like I’d been show-
ing pornography to kids.’ ”).
46. Shelton, supra note 9, at 201.
47. Jake Aryeh Marcus, Lactation and the Law, MOTHERING, July-Aug. 2007, at 48,
50. Though no state completely bans breastfeeding in public, Illinois limits a woman’s
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taken up the cause of protecting breastfeeding mothers from outside
intrusion.48 State legislatures have demonstrated, through the pas-
sage of these breastfeeding protection laws, that they recognize the
growing collection of scientific evidence that “establish[es] the sig-
nificant medical benefits of breastfeeding.” 49
Simultaneously, these legislatures have also rejected an idea
which a significant amount of their constituents embrace, the concept
of a woman’s breast as a solely sexual object, and have thus also re-
jected a “societal attitude keeping many women from breastfeeding
their children, especially in public.” 50 The states passing these laws
have the power to minimize the impact of that rather sexist concept
and promote the resurgence of a natural, instinctive act that can im-
prove the health of infants,51 and potentially save money in the long-
term by “reducing the need for publicly provided formula supplements,
health care, and child protective intervention.” 52 The very idea of
saving public dollars by encouraging a choice that has so many other
benefits alone should spur other states to pass such protective leg-
islation and support their mothers and children. The language of
breastfeeding protection legislation varies widely from state to
state,53 and while several issues remain unresolved, the varied lan-
guage can still provide instruction for future legislative enactments
and amendments.
One of the many cloudy issues roiling within the public breast-
feeding debate is whether women have a right to breastfeed their
children. A United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Dike
v. School Board of Orange County, held that a woman “enjoys a
constitutionally protected interest in breastfeeding her child.” 54
ability to breastfeed in a place of worship and Missouri requires that mothers breast-
feeding in public use “as much discretion as possible.” 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/10
(West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.918 (West 2009).
48. Though many states have breastfeeding protection laws,
Dr. Kathleen Marinelli . . . says that legislation doesn’t give a woman the
right to breastfeed but rather protects her from discrimination and the
potential of prosecution for exercising her given right to breastfeed her
child. “It’s important to realize and to acknowledge that women have a right
to breastfeed their children, whether that means breastfeeding in public or
expressing their milk in the workplace, whether a law exists or not.”
Marchant, supra note 27, at 66.
49. Olson, supra note 23, at 299.
50. Id.
51. Barkhuis, supra note 3, at 443.
52. Id.
53. See infra Part III (discussing various states’ legislation-construction choices).
54. Olson, supra note 23, at 289; see Dike v. School Bd. of Orange County, Fla., 650
F.2d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 1981) (“In light of the spectrum of interests that the Supreme
Court has held specially protected we conclude that the Constitution protects from
excessive state interference a woman’s decision respecting breastfeeding her child.”).
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Advocates generally assume that such a right is still not established,55
so they promote and support the passage of state and federal legis-
lation that provides women the right to breastfeed their children.56
Since no state completely bans public breastfeeding,57 the states that
have passed breastfeeding legislation essentially enacted clarification
statutes, making it clear to others in the community that women can
breastfeed their children in public spaces, with varying restrictions
on those mothers and the public that may or may not have been
intended by the authors of the legislation.58
Laws protecting public breastfeeding appear in a few basic
formats, ranging from criminal exemption language to statutes that
create a new civil right to breastfeed.59 The most basic statutes “spe-
cifically exempt breastfeeding from public nudity and other criminal
statutes,” 60 thus protecting a mother breastfeeding her child in public
from those police officers, security guards, and others that threaten
her with citation or arrest for feeding her child in an otherwise legal
manner of her choosing.61 Other statutes specifically “provide mothers
with the right to breastfeed wherever mothers and babies are other-
wise authorized to be.” 62 Most of these statutes granting a right to
breastfeed also state that if a mother and her child are authorized to
be in any one location, public or private, the mother may breastfeed
her child in that location.63 A law like this generally protects mothers
seeking to maintain a presence in the public sphere and still feed
their children as they choose. Under such a law, a woman should be
able to breastfeed her child in a store or a park, as long as she and
her child are both authorized to be there. She can breastfeed her
child even in places that are not government-owned, as a public
55. Marcus, supra note 47, at 50.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Olson, supra note 23, at 283 (“These new laws protecting a woman’s right to
breastfeed vary greatly in scope and level of effectiveness and range from protecting a
breastfeeding woman from prosecution for indecent exposure, to protecting a woman’s
right to breastfeed as a civil right, and excusing a breastfeeding mother from jury
service.”).
59. Shelton, supra note 9, at 186-87.
60. Id. at 186.
61. See id. at 181 (regarding police officers and security guards). Leigh Bellini, a
mother from Pennsylvania, was nursing her child in a shopping mall when “security
guards . . . offered her a free new blanket to ‘cover up’ while breast-feeding her son in
the mall’s food court after one customer lodged a complaint.” When she refused their
offer and continued breastfeeding, “security guards threatened to call police if she didn’t
move to a restroom,” though “Bellini said her breast was never exposed.” Susan E. Lindt,
Breast-Feeding Law Points to Rifts, INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster, Pa.), July 18, 2007,
at A1.
62. Shelton, supra note 9, at 186-87 (emphasis added).
63. Kent, supra note 5.
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place in this setting “is understood to include restaurants, stores,
shopping malls, and sports stadiums, and other places frequented
by the general public, even if they are privately owned.” 64 A problem
may arise, however, when a mother attempts to exercise her right to
breastfeed while at work, since a child would generally not be per-
mitted to be present at the workplace. Protecting breastfeeding in the
workplace is not, however, the subject of this Note. The third and
most protective type of legislation is that utilized by the State of New
York. It explicitly creates and protects a woman’s civil right to breast-
feed and imposes remedies she may use to enforce her right.65 These
remedies are perhaps one of the most important pieces of breast-
feeding protection legislation; however, many states refrain from
providing remedies to breastfeeding mothers who, while technically
protected under the law,66 may still find themselves harassed or ex-
cluded from public places because of their choice to breastfeed.67
Pennsylvania is one of these states.
Shortly after Pennsylvania’s Freedom to Breastfeed Act was
enacted, the Lancaster New Era, a local newspaper in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, published an article requesting that breastfeeding
mothers have “a little decorum, please.” 68 The article’s authors con-
ducted an informal survey, collecting reactions to the law such as,
“[d]on’t hang your boob out. Be discreet,” and, “[e]ven though you have
a right to do it, there’s a time and place to do it appropriately.” 69
Though other respondents thought the law was unnecessary, the
suggestion (or even demand) that nursing mothers “cover it up” sug-
gests that women breastfeeding in public may continue to run into
resistance until the community perception of a woman’s breast as
a sexual object changes.70
B. Debating Breastfeeding Protection Legislation
Though breastfeeding is a completely natural and instinctual
act,71 it has a varying history of public acceptance. Women have at
64. Id.
65. Shelton, supra note 9, at 189.
66. Marcus, supra note 47, at 52.
67. Mothers may find legally instituted remedies especially important as it has been
reported that “state courts have generally not supported a woman’s right to breastfeed.”
Olson, supra note 23, at 294. Without support from the courts, mothers are left only
with legislation for protection.
68. Cindy Stauffer & Jenna Spinelle, A Little Decorum, Please, LANCASTER NEW ERA
(Lancaster, Pa.), July 14, 2007, at A1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the biological benefits of
breastfeeding).
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certain times in the historical record felt free to breastfeed their in-
fants at home, but then have been chastised for doing the same thing
while out and about in their communities.72 A significant number
of states have taken steps to protect breastfeeding women from others
who seek to control their choices regarding child-rearing outside of
the home.73 Breastfeeding protection legislation protects a woman’s
choice as to whether to breastfeed or bottle-feed and publicizes the
state’s stance on the matter. Overall, this legislation represents a
victory for women’s and children’s rights in the greater society. The
patchwork of legislation, however, filled with holes and confusing
language, may serve only to confuse the situation.
Breastfeeding protection legislation is usually presented as legis-
lation intended to protect a mother’s choice regarding how and what
to feed her baby. Legislators, or at least those who successfully lobby
those legislators, are concerned about potential harassment of women
who do in fact choose to breastfeed their children in a public place.74
Delegates to the United Nations Conference on Women expressed
similar concerns when they said, “ ‘restrictive work arrangements,
social stigma and false information are denying [women] a choice in
how to feed their babies.’ ” 75 This legislation is intended to protect a
woman’s choice to feed her baby in a traditional and natural manner
by protecting her from societal harassment and by serving as the
state’s acknowledgment that it believes breastfeeding is the best
option for mothers and children and that breastfeeding should be
supported outside of the home.76
Besides supporting a woman’s right to choose to feed her infant
in a natural and legal manner, breastfeeding protection legislation can
also do its part to “chang[e] society’s attitudes about breastfeeding”
and can be “a critical factor in a woman’s decision to breastfeed.” 77
72. See supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text (detailing stories of women who
have experienced disapproval of breastfeeding in public).
73. See supra Part I.A (outlining the various types of breastfeeding protection
legislation states have enacted).
74. Shelton, supra note 9, at 180.
75. Id. (quoting Marcus Eliason, Rain Muddies Women’s Gathering, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, Sept. 2, 1995, at 11A).
76. Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.2 (West 2009). Pennsylvania’s
Freedom to Breastfeed Act’s policy statement states, “[t]he General Assembly finds that
breastfeeding a baby is an important and basic act of nurturing that must be protected
in the interests of maternal and child health and family values.” Id.; see also Barkhuis,
supra note 3, at 420 (“Furthermore, even after adjusting for such factors as lower birth
weight, maternal age, day care exposure, smoking, and socioeconomics, formula-fed
infants require hospitalization at rates fifteen times higher than breast-fed babies.”);
supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (regarding health benefits derived from breast-
feeding for both mother and baby).
77. Marchant, supra note 27, at 69.
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Since breastfeeding offers such great health benefits to both the
mother and the infant,78 it would seem to be in the state’s best in-
terest to fully support a mother’s attempt to breastfeed in order to
decrease health-maintenance costs and the incidence of preventable
diseases.79 Breastfeeding protection legislation thus can have a greater
impact than breastfeeding awareness campaigns alone.80 Mothers
can be told ad nauseum that “breast is best”; however, that message
will never be completely effective in its goal to make breastfeeding
a primary infant food source if the community is not also in full
support of mothers breastfeeding outside the home. Breastfeeding
protection legislation “ ‘tells people that we should all be supporting
breastfeeding, something that is best for moms, babies, families, and
society. . . .’ ” 81 This legislation legitimizes breastfeeding and takes a
large step toward eliminating the stigma of public breastfeeding.
While breastfeeding protection legislation certainly has enormous
benefits for children, mothers, and society at large, this kind of legis-
lation also has its drawbacks. An important thing to consider is that
even though a law may be passed protecting a mother and her choice
to breastfeed outside of her home, if the people she meets while she
is acting upon her choice vocally disapprove or otherwise make their
distaste known, the legislation may eventually become useless. Though
the law is in place to protect breastfeeding mothers, without some
sort of remedy for those mothers otherwise harassed in public, the
law alone will not be effective. Studies suggest that although a sig-
nificant portion of a surveyed community supports a mother’s right
to breastfeed her child in a public place, “[a] smaller percentage,
[twenty-eight] percent, disagreed or strongly disagreed” with the
notion that a woman has a right to breastfeed her child in public.82
Twenty-eight percent is nearly one-third of those surveyed, and it
seems, anecdotally, that that one-third can be the most vocal in its
disapproval of a young mother’s choice to feed her child in the manner
of her choosing.83 Breastfeeding protection legislation may seem like
78. Barkhuis, supra note 3, at 420; supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
79. Cruver-Smith, supra note 28, at 171.
80. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., BREASTFEEDING REPORT CARD — UNITED STATES, 2008 4 (2008), http://cochise.az
.gov/uploadedFiles/Health/2008%20Breastfeeding%20Report%20Card.pdf (“Legislation
reflects social acceptance of breastfeeding as a ‘normal’ activity, concern for the health and
well-being of children, and the importance of breastfeeding as a public health issue.”).
81. Marchant, supra note 27, at 69.
82. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 23, at 40-42.
83. See Lindt, supra note 61, at A1 (relating nursing mother Leigh Bellini’s story of
when she was threatened with police interference because she was breastfeeding her son
in a shopping mall); Stauffer & Spinelle, supra note 68, at A1 (asking nursing mothers
to cover up in public). Blair Stackhouse, questioning the Freedom to Breastfeed Act, wrote:
2010] A PERMISSION SLIP TO BREASTFEED 793
a wonderful idea, but in communities that foster little support for
mothers choosing to breastfeed outside of the home, the creation of
such legislation may be a waste of time if not accompanied by strong
remedies for mothers who are made to feel uncomfortable and per-
secuted for their legal and healthy choice. The best way to change
minds, however, may just be to change laws.84
Some scholars and commentators argue that breastfeeding legis-
lation is both unnecessary and insulting to the autonomous structure
of our society. George Kent suggests that breastfeeding protection
legislation disturbs the “nurturing relationship between mother and
child.” 85 This sacred relationship encompasses the mother’s right
to make certain choices regarding the upbringing of her child and
should not be interfered with by “what some governmental agencies
decide is the optimal diet.” 86 Karen Kedrowski argues that the “breast
is best” slogan “ignores and marginalizes women who are either unable
or unwilling to go along with the command to breastfeed.” 87 These
suggested norms, in which the breast is considered the absolute pin-
nacle of sources of infant nutrition, tend to ignore that women and
mothers must make choices everyday for what is best for their own
bodies and families, and that “the decision of whether or not to breast-
feed is but one, regardless of its importance, competing concern.” 88
Both of these authors maintain that government should not interfere
at all with a woman’s choice to breastfeed her child or not, especially
since mothers must balance multiple concerns and basic realities
when making that choice.89 The argument, it seems, is that the
What about the people who don’t want to see this? I, for one, do not want to
be walking through a mall only to see mothers breast-feeding their children.
One would think the mothers would have enough respect for those around
them not to do this in public. Don’t they think about how uncomfortable
this might make people around them?
Blair Stackhouse, Disrespectful Moms, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 14, 2007, at B6.
84. See Marchant, supra note 27, at 69 (“But, says Dr. [Barbara] Philipp, society won’t
support breastfeeding until the laws change, which is why Massachusetts and other
states need breastfeeding legislation. ‘We need this bill as fast as we can get it, and we
need to support breastfeeding in the strongest terms,’ she says. ‘Let’s make it clear that
breastfeeding is not a form of indecent exposure or lewd behavior.’ ”).
85. Kent, supra note 5.
86. Id. “It is only in extremis that the judgments of governments should override
those of mothers, and then only when there is solid scientific evidence to support that
judgment.” Id.
87. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 23, at 33.
88. Id.
89. See id. (referencing the “operative assumptions and biases within the medical
community,” and the “cultural assumptions about the propriety of breastfeeding, the
sexual nature of the breast, and about norms of what constitutes the proper space and
body required for breastfeeding”); id. at 89 (suggesting that “diverse laws and court cases
demonstrate how the question of breastfeeding rights is an area where several rights-
bearing entities collide — mothers, fathers, infants, and employers”).
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government’s choice and support of one method over another, both
relatively safe and effective, places women who cannot or do not
choose to breastfeed at a relative disadvantage, imagined or not, in
the greater community. One must remember, however, that in some
communities, these laws may be the only thing that protects a woman
who can and does make the choice to breastfeed. Reality requires a
careful balancing of the feelings of non-breastfeeding mothers who
may feel covertly rejected by these government campaigns with the
overt hostility experienced by some mothers who actually attempt
to breastfeed outside of the home.
Though there are varying opinions concerning the necessity or
use of the breastfeeding protection laws, many states have written
and enacted them in a widespread attempt to protect a woman’s choice
to breastfeed. Perhaps states write these in an attempt to change
the social fabric regarding public breastfeeding,90 or maybe these
laws are solely in place to protect a woman’s choice to feed her child
a natural and legal substance without actually championing a partic-
ular cause. Each state that does have this kind of legislation in place91
puts its own spin on it. Unfortunately, this tends to create “an un-
even patchwork of state laws” 92 under which “some women continue
to enjoy more legal protections for their right to breastfeed, simply
by accident of location, than many of their sisters in other states.” 93
Pennsylvania recently enacted its own version of a breastfeeding-
protection law, the Freedom to Breastfeed Act.94
II. PENNSYLVANIA’S FREEDOM TO BREASTFEED ACT
Pennsylvania Governor Edward G. Rendell signed the Freedom
to Breastfeed Act into law on Sunday, July 8, 2007.95 Pennsylvania
thus became the “39th state to protect the rights of women who breast-
feed in public.” 96 The law’s text recognizes the physical and mental
health benefits breastfeeding can bring to both mother and infant,97
stating that “breastfeeding a baby is an important and basic act of
nurturing that must be protected in the interests of maternal and
child health and family values.” 98 Granting mothers some protection
90. Marchant, supra note 27, at 69.
91. For a concise survey of individual state breastfeeding protection laws, see Nat’l
Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 16.
92. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 23, at 114.
93. Id.
94. Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 636.1-.4 (West 2009).
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when they choose to breastfeed their babies in public spaces, the Act
states, “[a] mother shall be permitted to breastfeed her child in any
location, public or private, where the mother and child are other-
wise authorized to be present, irrespective of whether or not the
mother’s breast is covered during or incidental to breastfeeding.” 99
The legislation also declares that public breastfeeding “shall not be
considered”100 to be a variety of crimes outlined in the criminal code,
including public indecency,101 “open lewdness,”102 obscene conduct,103
or a nuisance act.104
While the Freedom to Breastfeed Act is a great step forward for
protection of mothers throughout the Commonwealth, it is not as
strong as it could or should be. Some commentators argue that the
law does not grant nursing mothers a right at all and is in fact a com-
pletely empty law.105 This argument, which insists the Pennsylvania
legislature should amend the law to grant mothers an explicit right
to breastfeed in public, will only encounter further resistance in
Pennsylvania, as demonstrated by the sponsoring state senator’s
initial experience.106 Instead, the Freedom to Breastfeed Act lacks
substantial force, because it declines to give nursing mothers a legal
remedy should someone interfere with their rights, regardless of
the law.107 The Act should thus be amended to provide a remedy for
mothers who encounter such a situation.
A. Legislative Word Choice and the “Right to Breastfeed” Argument
A legislator’s word choice is an important consideration in the
analysis of a particular piece of legislation, as it reveals exactly
what the legislator is attempting to achieve. While the Freedom to
Breastfeed Act was signed into law without the word “right,” it
allegedly, and possibly facially, effectuates the same goal.108 Inter-
estingly, the Act’s sponsor, Senator Connie Williams, a Democrat
99. Id. § 636.3.
100. Id. § 636.4.
101. Id. § 636.4(1).
102. Id. § 636.4(2).
103. Id. § 636.4(3).
104. Id. § 636.4(4).
105. See infra Part III.A (discussing Pennsylvania breastfeeding advocates and the
“right to breastfeed” crusade).
106. See infra Part II.A (discussing the legislative battle over Pennsylvania’s Freedom
to Breastfeed Act).
107. See infra Part IV (discussing the need for legal remedies).
108. See § 636.2 (stating the Freedom to Breastfeed Act’s Declaration of Policy). The
legislature’s established goal was to support the efforts of breastfeeding mothers across
the Commonwealth. Id.
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of Montgomery County,109 originally chose to specifically grant a
“right” to breastfeed in public to nursing mothers.110 Ultimately, she
chose to drop the “right” language and replace it with the title “The
Freedom to Breastfeed Act”111 and the words, “[a] [nursing] mother
shall be permitted to breastfeed her child . . . .”112 The Senator’s
spokesperson suggested that this change was absolutely necessary
“to get the bill passed in the Senate,”113 and that “the changes deal
primarily with semantics, not substance.”114 The Senator’s spokes-
person suggested that “[i]n the eyes of many Republicans . . . listing
breast-feeding as a right would have equated it to such basic freedoms
as those described in the Bill of Rights.”115 Though the Republicans
may not have approved of the granting of a specific “right” to breast-
feed one’s child in public, Senator Williams ultimately pushed the
breastfeeding protection through, though she had to jump through
some semantic hoops to achieve her goal.116 The change in language,
however, greatly displeased a segment of the Commonwealth’s breast-
feeding rights lobby.
There is a small yet vocal contingent of Pennsylvania breastfeed-
ing activists who submit that, when the text of the original proposed
act was changed from granting mothers the “right to breastfeed”117
to the “[f]reedom to [b]reastfeed,”118 the Act lost nearly all of its
strength. Jake Marcus, a Pennsylvania attorney with Birth Without
Boundaries and a lactation activist,119 suggested that, without the
specific language making breastfeeding a “right,”
a woman who breastfeeds in a public accommodation — a pri-
vately owned place open to the public, such as a restaurant or
shopping mall — might lawfully be asked to leave, either by the
owner or in accordance with the owner’s instructions. If she
109. Lyons, supra note 2.
110. S.B. 34, 191st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (Printer’s No. 67).
111. § 636.1.
112. Id. § 636.3 (emphasis added).
113. Kori Walter, Nursing Mother Opposes Measure, READING EAGLE (Reading, Pa.),
May 23, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 9665090.
114. Id.; see also Felix Alfonso Pena, Breast-feeding Law Dissatisfies Activists, READING
EAGLE (Reading, Pa.), July 10, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 1348040 (“According to
Williams, the bill would have languished in the state Senate had the word ‘right’ not
been replaced by ‘freedom’ because Senate Republicans took issue with calling breast-
feeding a right.”).
115. Pena, supra note 114.
116. Id.
117. S.B. 34, 191st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (Printer’s No. 67).
118. Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.1 (West 2009).
119. Walter, supra note 113.
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refuses, she might be removed by the police or placed under
arrest for trespass.120
Marcus has also stated that removing “right” from the Act shifted
the legislation’s focus from active protection to mere policy state-
ment.121 She stated that this “law does not change the right of the
owner of a public accommodation, a store or restaurant, to with-
draw a woman’s authorization to be there. If he does that, she can
be arrested for trespass.”122 More specifically, Marcus argued that
since the Act does not forbid owners of public accommodations from
withdrawing consent for nursing mothers to be on the property,
mothers would still be at risk for being charged with a number of
trespass crimes,123 such as defiant trespass.124
Marcus’s argument, however, may not be on such solid ground.
Although she presents an interesting assertion, there may be a better
solution for the problem at hand, like a change in syntax or word
choice. Writing that nursing mothers “shall be permitted” to breast-
feed instead of something similar to “have the right to breastfeed”
helped Senator Williams get her bill through the Pennsylvania legis-
lature, but it also created a semantic riddle. The Senator herself, how-
ever, has argued that the differing phrases mean the same thing.
“ ‘We’re using ‘shall,’ which in legislative language means it must be
permitted.’ ”125 The Senator further stated that many other states
use the same or similar language.126 The reasoning behind this word
choice is facially correct, though the resulting legislation in this case
is confusing.127 The Act as it now stands apparently states that any
person or business must allow a nursing mother to breastfeed where
she is otherwise authorized to be; it imposes a duty upon a third
120. Marcus, supra note 47, at 50.
121. See Walter, supra note 113 (“ ‘It doesn’t actually create any kind of law or
enforceable activity.’ ”).
122. Breastfeeding in Public Bill Passes Pennsylvania House, THE LACTIVIST, July 4,
2007, http://thelactivist.blogspot.com/2007/07/breastfeeding-in-public-bill-passes.html.
123. Marcus, supra note 47, at 50; see also Posting of Jake to THE LACTIVIST, http://
thelactivist.blogspot.com/2007/07/breastfeeding-in-public-bill-passes.html (July 4, 2007,
09:03 EST) (“In states without language limiting the right to withdraw authorization
to be in a space, women are routinely harassed or legally threatened with arrest for
trespass by property owners.”).
124. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503 (West 2009). Since Pennsylvania has not used
the Act to make nursing mothers a protected class, Marcus appears to argue that mothers
asked to leave a public accommodation because of their choice to nurse would have no
constitutional recourse available to them. This argument, however, is not the subject
of this Note.
125. Pena, supra note 114.
126. Id.
127. See infra Part III for a more in-depth discussion of changes that could be made
to the statutory language.
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party not to interfere with a nursing mother’s choice to breastfeed
in public.128 The Legislative Drafter’s Desk Reference states that a
legislator should, “[w]hen requiring that some action be taken, use
‘shall’ rather than ‘is directed to’ or ‘must.’ ”129 The Act thus requires
those interacting with a nursing mother in public to allow her to con-
tinue breastfeeding.130 A subsequent clause in the Act attempts to
strengthen the permissive clause by stating that a mother must be
allowed to breastfeed “irrespective of whether or not . . . [her] breast
is covered during or incidental to the breastfeeding.”131 This clause
preempts an attempt to remove a nursing mother from a public place
for the sole reason that a part of her breast, or her entire breast, is
exposed at any one moment. The Act also prevents a law enforcement
officer from citing a nursing mother for crimes such as “[i]ndecent
exposure,”132 “[o]pen lewdness,”133 “[o]bscenity or sexual conduct,”134
or “nuisance.”135
While the Act does not specifically state that a woman has the
“right” to breastfeed, its sponsor’s choice of words still grants a strong
protection to nursing mothers throughout Pennsylvania, if only be-
cause it reminds the community that the Commonwealth officially
supports breastfeeding. Although this Act is strong in that respect,
it only clarifies what nursing mothers are generally permitted to do
anyway, as there is, and was, no law in Pennsylvania explicitly for-
bidding public breastfeeding. The Act essentially gives mothers only
the permission to do something they were otherwise permitted to
do, and states that as long as they are breastfeeding in a location in
which they are otherwise allowed to be, they cannot be removed from
that location solely because they are breastfeeding. It offers, how-
ever, no hint of potential repercussions if a nursing mother is so
ejected. The Freedom to Breastfeed Act is only the first step to guar-
anteeing women the ability to breastfeed in public without any fear
of retribution or harassment; it serves only as an in-road for women’s
rights everywhere in the Commonwealth.
128. See LAWRENCE E. FILSON & SANDRA L. STROKOFF, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER’S
DESK REFERENCE § 22.2 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the implications of choosing “shall”
and “may” when drafting legislation).
129. Id.
130. Compare id. (discussing legislative word choice), with Freedom to Breastfeed
Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.3 (West 2009) (“A mother shall be permitted to breast-
feed . . . .”). See also REED DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING § 7.4 (1954) (“If an obli-
gation to act is imposed, use shall.”). Here, the Act appears to be imposing the obligation
on others to leave a nursing mother alone and permit her to continue to nurse her child.
131. § 636.3.
132. Id. § 636.4(1).
133. Id. § 636.4(2).
134. Id. § 636.4(3).
135. Id. § 636.4(4).
2010] A PERMISSION SLIP TO BREASTFEED 799
Pennsylvania’s Freedom to Breastfeed Act appears relatively
strong on its surface. It serves as a statutory reminder to the citizens
of the Commonwealth that nursing mothers can in fact breastfeed
their children in public places. It also puts fellow citizens on notice
that the Pennsylvania legislature recognizes the benefits mothers
and infants can gain from community-supported breastfeeding, which
include a variety of psychological, social, and health benefits.136 The
Freedom to Breastfeed Act can be even stronger, and many states
have had much success with stronger laws.137 A stronger breastfeed-
ing protection act would put Pennsylvania on par with its neighbors
New York,138 Connecticut,139 and New Jersey,140 as well as a number
of other states across the country.141 This Note applauds Pennsylvania
for its initial foray into the realm of breastfeeding protection legis-
lation and its support of nursing mothers. It argues, however, that
Pennsylvania can take a lesson from its neighbors and make its
statutory language more clear. In particular, Pennsylvania should
provide a legal remedy for those mothers who may still find their
opportunity to breastfeed in public limited or erased altogether.
III. STRENGTHENING PENNSYLVANIA’S LEGISLATION
Pennsylvania’s legislation offers nursing mothers essentially
only the state legislature’s blessing when these mothers attempt to
136. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text (discussing the physical and mental
health benefits derived from breastfeeding). Breastfeeding also “encourages women’s
self-reliance, reduces women’s dependence on the medical profession, allows women to
value their own capacities, encourages solidarity and cooperation among women, and
reminds society that women’s breasts are a source of food and comfort for children, not
sex objects.” Cruver-Smith, supra note 28, at 173.
137. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 16 (providing a survey of state
breastfeeding protection laws).
138. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-e (McKinney 2009) (stating a mother “may breast feed
her baby” in a public place); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 206-c (McKinney 2009) (instructing an
employer to provide a time and location for a mother to express breast milk); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 2008) (exempting nursing mothers from prosecution for
indecent exposure).
139. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 2009). Connecticut states that it is illegal
discrimination for a public accommodation to restrict or limit the right of a mother to
breastfeed her child, and provides for a fine. Id.
140. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (West 2007). In New Jersey, a mother is entitled to
breastfeed her child in a public accommodation. New Jersey also provides a remedy in
the form of fines for a nursing mother who is prevented from breastfeeding in public by
another person. Id. § 26:4B-5.
141. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-21 (2009) (stating it is discrimination to limit access
to a public accommodation because a woman is breastfeeding a child); id. § 489-22
(providing a private cause of action for a woman discriminated against because of her
breastfeeding); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(j) (2009) (stating the operator of a public
accommodation cannot discriminate against a breastfeeding woman). For further dis-
cussion regarding the Vermont statute, see infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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breastfeed their babies in public or quasi-public spaces. Therefore,
Pennsylvania should amend the Freedom to Breastfeed Act in a
number of ways. The legislature should clarify the Act’s language
in order to make Senator Williams’s allegedly granted “right to
breastfeed” more clear. There are several tactics the legislature could
employ and other states the legislature could model.142 Primarily, the
legislature should enact a statutory method of remedy for nursing
mothers whose ability to breastfeed in public is limited, especially
since the legislature, by enacting this statute in the first place, has
so publicly placed its support behind breastfeeding mothers. Instead
of retaining an empty bill, Pennsylvania should stand strong for its
nursing mothers and put the full power of the Commonwealth behind
them and their decisions. This section first discusses the language
issues the statute appears to have and will offer potential solutions.
Part IV then argues for the inclusion of a remedy clause to the Act.
A. Word Choice and the Freedom to Breastfeed Act
As discussed, Pennsylvania’s Freedom to Breastfeed Act states
that a nursing mother “shall be permitted” to breastfeed her child
in a place where she and her child are otherwise authorized to be
present.143 According to Senator Williams, this language is equiva-
lent to granting the right to breastfeed in a public place to a nursing
mother.144 A plain reading of the statute, however, reveals that the
language instead places a duty upon another to leave the mother alone
to breastfeed her child. Since public breastfeeding is not prohibited
in Pennsylvania, the Act is really only chiding others for interfering
with something a mother is already permitted to do.145 Saying a
mother “shall be permitted” to do something she is implicitly already
permitted to do is a waste of legislative time, statutory paper, and
space on a law library’s shelf. The language as it now stands has cre-
ated confusion regarding exactly how much freedom nursing mothers
have been granted:146 is a mother’s ability to nurse just reiterated
142. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (referencing states using “may” lan-
guage in their breastfeeding protection statutes); infra note 165 and accompanying text
(referencing states using “entitled” language); see also infra Part III.D (referencing
states granting remedies to mothers whose choice to breastfeed outside the home is
limited by a bystander).
143. Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.3 (West 2009).
144. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (regarding the sponsoring Senator’s
defense of the legislation’s word choice).
145. See Pena, supra note 114 (“ ‘It just says that you are permitted the freedom (to
breastfeed), which we already had,’ Leigh Bellini said.”).
146. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (regarding the trespass argument).
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or are there now consequences dealt to a person who restricts or re-
moves her freedom to breastfeed? For example, regarding a business
owner’s ability to remove a nursing mother from his establishment,
Sally Kalson of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette wrote that the Freedom
to Breastfeed Act allows mothers to nurse “without fear of being
ejected from the premises.”147 Senator Williams, however, stated that
rather than a business owner being completely banned from eject-
ing a mother, the Act makes it “very difficult to throw someone out
now, which they did before.”148 Yet, this is not quite the same as a
complete protection from ejection. Breastfeeding advocates argue
that the law’s language does nothing to protect a mother in this situ-
ation, as “a private business owner may still ask a breast-feeding
mother to leave. And if she doesn’t, she could still be charged with
trespassing — a charge not specifically mentioned in the statute.”149
A law which purports to protect nursing mothers, yet is so sus-
ceptible to such dramatic variations in interpretation, is far from
useful or protective. While the law and the drafting legislature should
be commended for so explicitly removing the possibility of a nursing
mother being cited for indecency or obscenity violations,150 these addi-
tions really only protect a nursing mother from the state or a state
actor, such as the police. If Pennsylvania is so supportive of a woman’s
choice to breastfeed,151 the legislature should make a stronger attempt
to protect a nursing mother from harassment by bystanders and other
non-state-actor citizens. A stronger breastfeeding protection statute
would more completely protect today’s nursing mothers, as well as
begin minimizing, and ultimately erasing, the community’s hidden
disapproval of necessary, yet public, breastfeeding. The Pennsylvania
legislature should amend the Act and choose one of several options,
all of which would more accurately clarify a woman’s ability to breast-
feed in public and more strongly protect her choice to do so.
B. “May” Language
At least twenty-two states with breastfeeding protection stat-
utes on the books use language similar to “a mother may breastfeed
her child in any public or private place in which she is otherwise
147. Sally Kalson, New Law Offers Breast-Feeding Guarantee, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, July 11, 2007, at B3.
148. Id.
149. Lindt, supra note 61, at A1.
150. Freedom to Breastfeed Act, 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.4 (West 2009).
151. See id. § 636.2 (stating the Freedom to Breastfeed Act’s Declaration of Policy).
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authorized to be.”152 Contrary to Senator Williams’s assertion,153 no
other state currently uses language stating that a mother “shall be
permitted” to breastfeed her child in a public place.154 The reason
for this may be quite obvious: the language Pennsylvania has chosen
is incredibly confusing, as previously discussed. Neither the statute
nor the Commonwealth’s statutory rules of construction155 define
what exactly “permission” is, and the statute fails to say exactly who
is supposed to be the active “permitter” in an interaction between
a nursing mother and a bystander. Is it the bystander, the owner or
operator of the place where the mother happens to be, or somebody
else? A change in phrase may most easily remedy this confusion.
Legislative drafters often choose the “may” language, rather than
the “shall be permitted” language because it resolves the question of
to whom exactly the law is speaking.156 The statement that a mother
“shall be permitted” to breastfeed implies that a person other than
the mother is the subject of this statute, and that the other person
is now limited in his actions regarding the nursing mother. This lan-
guage muddles the overall issue and intent of the legislation, which
was to protect a nursing mother. This language also affords nothing
152. These states include: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 22-1-13 (2009)); Arkansas (ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-27-2001 (West 2009)); California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.3 (West 2009));
Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-6-302 (West 2009)); Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 383.015 (West 2009)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-9 (West 2008)); Illinois (740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 137/10 (West 2009)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 16-35-6-1 (West 2009));
Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.30A (West 2009)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1,248
(2009)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.755 (West 2009)); Louisiana (LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:2247.1(B) (2003)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4634 (2008));
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-801 (West 2009)); Minnesota (MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.905 (West 2009)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-25-9 (West
2009)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-20-1 (West 2009)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-190.9(b) (West 2009)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-234.1
(West 2009)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.001 (West 2009)); Vermont (VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(j) (2009)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-1147.1 (West 2009)).
Virginia only protects breastfeeding “on property owned, leased, or controlled by the
Commonwealth.” § 2.2-1147.1. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note
16, for a concise collection of the current state breastfeeding protection laws.
153. Pena, supra note 114.
154. This information was gleaned from the author’s review of the information pro-
vided by Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 16. Utah has the most
similar language to Pennsylvania’s statute, stating that someone “may not prohibit” a
mother from breastfeeding. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-15-25 (West 2009). Utah, however,
merely turns the “may” language on its end and removes a certain action from the
mother’s potential opponent, while Pennsylvania’s language requires someone to take
an affirmative action. Id.
155. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1991 (West 2009).
156. FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 128, § 22.2 (“When requiring that some action
be taken, use ‘shall’ rather than ‘is directed to’ or ‘must’; and when permitting some action
to be taken, or granting a right, privilege, power, or authority, use ‘may’ rather than ‘is
authorized [or empowered] to.’ ”).
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new to the nursing mother, as she is not the subject of the sentence;
it only attempts to limit a bystander’s actions. Pennsylvania’s Act
may be construed as directed toward nursing mothers, giving them
the right to breastfeed in public, but instead its passive language
states that the people around those mothers shall permit them to
breastfeed, that those bystanders shall stay out of the way. The United
States House of Representatives legislative drafting manual provides
an example of the problems faced when utilizing the passive voice
in statutory language: “[t]he use of the passive in ‘Proceeds derived
from such sale shall be deposited into the Treasury’ obscures whose
proceeds are covered and who bears responsibility for making the
deposits.”157 By this example, the Freedom to Breastfeed Act propa-
gates confusion; it is unclear to whom exactly the Act is speaking.
If Pennsylvania really wants to protect nursing mothers, the leg-
islature should make the language of the Act active. Since the leg-
islature appears uncomfortable with granting nursing mothers an
explicit “right” to breastfeed,158 I suggest that Pennsylvania adopt the
“may” language that the majority of other states are using.159 In fact,
[t]he best way to confer a right, privilege, power or authority
upon an individual is through the use of a sentence, in the active
voice, whose subject is that individual and whose main verb is
accompanied by the auxiliary verb ‘may’. . . . This form should
not be unnecessarily varied or embellished either.160
Senator Williams and the Pennsylvania legislature chose not the
best way, but a confused and twisted way, if in fact the Senator was
trying to confer the right as she claimed. Though she avoided the
Republicans’ wrath by removing the “right” language, the Senator
could have emphasized the same point by stating that breastfeeding
mothers “may breastfeed” their children in a public place, like so many
other states across the country. The “may” language removes the re-
quired action from the hands of the bystander and places authority
squarely in the hands of the mother who made the choice to breast-
feed in the first place. The Senator’s ultimate word choice muddles
the Act’s stated intent161 and confuses the day-to-day application of
the statute.
157. OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 59-60 (1995), available at http://
www.house.gov/legcoun/pdf/draftstyle.pdf.
158. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative problems
with the “right” to breastfeed language).
159. See supra note 153 (listing states whose statutes use the “may” language).
160. FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 128, § 22.2.
161. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.2 (West 2009) (stating the Act’s Declaration of Policy).
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Though Pennsylvania’s statutory construction rules state that
“when the words of the statute are not explicit” the intention of the
legislature controls,162 the Act’s own language frustrates this statute’s
intent. The legislature holds that it “finds that breastfeeding a baby
is an important and basic act of nurturing that must be protected in
the interests of maternal and child health and family values,”163 but
the statute’s word choice for the General Rule clause fails to clarify
whether the legislature wishes to protect nursing mothers by expand-
ing their authority to breastfeed or by limiting others’ rights to take
certain actions or make comments regarding those nursing mothers.164
C. “Entitlement” Language
Rather than choosing the “may breastfeed” language, though it
does offer nearly unparalleled clarity and places the power of the stat-
ute in the hands of the mother rather than a bystander, Pennsylvania
could have instead simply stated that a mother is “entitled to breast-
feed.” Several states use language like this,165 some in conjunction with
enforcement statutes and optional legal remedies.166 The “entitle-
ment” language has nearly the same effect as the “may” word choice,
as it confers a right or privilege to take a certain action.167 Some states
simply may have chosen this language in order to completely resolve
any “doubt about who has the option” to exercise that privilege.168
Those legislatures, intending to give nursing mothers the option to
breastfeed in public if they so wish,169 may have chosen the “entitled
to breastfeed” language because the “may” language could leave the
statute unclear as to whether someone other than the nursing mother
is statutorily obligated to facilitate a nursing mother’s needs.170
Pennsylvania’s legislature could choose to state that a nursing mother
“is entitled to breastfeed her child” in a public place; this choice would
also clear up the confusion that the “shall be permitted” language
162. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (West 2009).
163. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 636.2 (West 2009).
164. See id. § 636.3 (using the “shall be permitted to breastfeed” language).
165. These states include Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1443 (2009)), Delaware
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 310 (2009)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (West
2009)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55 (West 2009)), and Texas (TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.002 (Vernon 2009)).
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-5 (West 2009).
167. FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 128, § 22.2.
168. Id.
169. See supra note 165 (states using “entitled” language and the accompanying
statutory intent clauses).
170. See FILSON & STROKOFF, supra note 128, § 22.2 (discussing how inclusion of “may”
often makes a statute ambiguous).
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has created. The “may” language, however, is already very clear and,
from a simplicity standpoint, would be the best choice.
D. Anti-Discrimination and the Civil Right to Breastfeed
A handful of legislatures opted to structure their breastfeeding
protection laws differently than the aforementioned states. These
states provide a private right of action to nursing mothers who were
discriminated against based on their choice to breastfeed.171 Some,
like Louisiana, prohibit discrimination against a nursing mother be-
cause of her choice to breastfeed in public.172 New Hampshire com-
bined anti-discrimination language and the creation of a civil right
when it codified that restricting or limiting a mother’s right to
breastfeed in a public place is discriminatory.173 Anti-discrimination
language provides nursing mothers with a higher authority to turn
to when they feel their opportunity to breastfeed has been limited; it
“provide[s] a basis for asserting a violation of a woman’s civil rights
stemming from discrimination against breastfeeding.”174 It also
places a greater amount of state force behind a nursing mother and
asserts nearly outright that she has a “right” to breastfeed her child
in public. Unfortunately, this anti-discrimination language would
probably not be the best option for Pennsylvania given the resistance
the original bill met in the legislative session.175
IV. THE ‘REMEDY’ SOLUTION
Changing the statute’s chosen language is a good idea for clari-
fication purposes, but this Note suggests that the legislature focus on
adding a legal remedy for a nursing mother who is not “permitted”
to breastfeed her child in a public place where she is otherwise autho-
rized to be. The statute, as it now stands, provides no affirmative
remedies for a woman who finds herself permitted by state law to
breastfeed in public, but in day-to-day life is prohibited from doing
so by external interference.176
171. Clark & Wohl, supra note 4, at 1; see also Marcus, supra note 47, at 52 (“Laws
in some states also create a private right of action for someone who has suffered discrimi-
nation, which means that a woman may file a lawsuit to recover money damages.”).
172. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2247.1(B) (2009).
173. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:10-d (2009).
174. Shelton, supra note 9, at 190.
175. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing the political resistance with
which the bill was met).
176. See supra note 61 (story of Leigh Bellini); see also Marcus, supra note 47, at 51-
52 (cataloging more stories of mothers being harassed when attempting to breastfeed
outside of their homes).
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Interestingly, a draft version of the bill did include a remedy and
private right of action for the harmed nursing mother.177 Unfortu-
nately, this provision was removed during discussion in the Common-
wealth’s House of Representatives only a few days before the governor
signed the bill into law.178 The amending state representative argued
that the version of the bill without the remedy would be “more likely
to actually make it to the Governor’s desk.”179 He stated that the
bill already had protection for nursing mothers from criminal prose-
cution, so “[t]here would be no basis . . . for anybody to interfere with
any woman who is breastfeeding a child so long as both she and the
child had a right to be in that place otherwise.”180 The representative
suggested that since the bill explicitly stated that public breastfeed-
ing was not illegal, “the justification for any untoward conduct to-
wards a woman who was nursing a child would be removed under the
statute.”181 Unfortunately, it seems that
[t]he general feeling among legislators and breast-feeding pro-
ponents is that the legislation in its present form is enough to
empower women. They say it is as a result of the recently enacted
statutes that many women stand firm in the face of harassment
and refuse to leave public places to breast-feed their children, that
women are empowered simply by knowing that breast-feeding
is not only the right thing to do, but a protected right. Furthermore,
they say breast-feeding legislation breeds confidence in women
who make the choice to breast-feed.182
While this may be true, a nursing mother would be even more em-
powered when she has the full power of the law behind her, when
she could say to a disapproving, harassing bystander that her choice
to breastfeed is fully protected and that the Commonwealth is will-
ing to levy fines and punishment against those who wish to infringe
upon that protection.183 After all, “a right without a remedy is no
right at all.”184
177. S.B. 34, 191st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (Printer’s No. 1252).
178. COMMONWEALTH OF PA., 64 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES, 1633 (July 3, 2007) [hereinafter PA. LEGIS. JOURNAL].
179. Id. at 1632.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1633.
182. Cruver-Smith, supra note 28, at 177.
183. The sponsor of the original remedy clause responded to the amending repre-
sentative, stating, “I brought my amendment because I really did believe that and do
continue to believe, having been a victim of being harassed [for breastfeeding], that it
is important for women to be able to go to court and to vindicate their right to breastfeed.”
PA. LEGIS. JOURNAL, supra note 178, at 1633.
184. Marcus, supra note 47, at 50 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
163 (1803)).
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Without a remedy, Pennsylvania’s statute appears to be largely
useless; the Act only legalizes what is already legal, but provides no
recourse for women who are prevented from breastfeeding. The
legislature could attempt to imply a remedy by stating, as Maryland
does, that a mother has a right to breastfeed and “that ‘a person may
not restrict or limit the right of a mother to breastfeed her child.’ ”185
Maryland thus provides a nursing mother a “right” and also provides
some protection against non-state actors who may interfere with that
right by stating explicitly that a person is prohibited from interfering.
The statute, however, does not explicitly state what would happen
to a person who does limit that mother’s right.186 An actual remedy
makes such language stronger, as the threat of fines and litigation
may be a greater deterrent than the idea that one would be imposing
on another’s rights by illegally prohibiting public breastfeeding.187
At least four states currently provide some sort of remedy for a
nursing mother prevented, in violation of the law, from breastfeed-
ing her child in public.188 Interestingly, three of these states are
Pennsylvania’s neighbors. Connecticut and New Jersey both impose
fines for interfering with a nursing mother’s right to breastfeed, and
New York allows a mother to sue for damages when another person
prevents her from breastfeeding in public.189 New York, perhaps the
best model for breastfeeding legislation, allows a nursing mother to
claim damages against any individual who violates that mother’s civil
right to breastfeed.190 Vermont, like Pennsylvania, allows a mother
to breastfeed her child in “any place of public accommodation in which
the mother and child would otherwise have a legal right to be.”191
Vermont enforces its provision, however, by giving “mothers the abil-
ity to file a charge of discrimination with the HRC [Human Rights
Commission] . . . or to ‘bring an action for injunctive relief and com-
pensatory and punitive damages and any other appropriate relief ’ ”
in court.192
A remedy similar to New York’s or Vermont’s would eliminate the
worry surrounding the effect private trespass law would have on a
mother nursing in a restaurant or a shopping mall in Pennsylvania.193
185. Marchant, supra note 27, at 67.
186. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-801 (West 2009).
187. See Shelton, supra note 9, at 189 (“The availability of a remedy is important in
deterring much of the informal harassment surrounding breastfeeding.”).
188. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 23, at 98.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(j) (2009).
192. Clark & Wohl, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4506 (2009)).
193. Shelton, supra note 9, at 189.
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For instance, a mother nursing her baby “who is asked to leave a res-
taurant can say more than just, ‘I have a right to breastfeed here, you
know.’ Indeed she can threaten or even bring suit.”194 A “business,
concerned about breastfeeding on the premises, must be careful about
the manner in which it approaches the mother and child,” because
these laws give a discriminated-against mother a remedy and seem
to strike a balance between the rights of nursing mothers and the
rights of businesses.195 Currently, a nursing mother in Pennsylvania
is protected by the statute in name only; she cannot stand up for
herself using the threat of a lawsuit or fine as her cudgel.196 The leg-
islature may believe that the protectionist language is enough to
protect these mothers,197 but in an American society where “two out
of three Americans think breast-feeding is the best way to feed a
baby,”198 but “a quarter say they feel uncomfortable seeing women
do it,”199 and in a state where a front page article in the Lancaster
New Era following the passage of the Act pleads, “[j]ust cover it up,
ladies,” 200 it appears mothers certainly do need the full power of a
remedy with which to back their claim of right.
Other states also offer their nursing mothers injunctive relief
against the individual or entity preventing them from breastfeeding
their infants in public, or otherwise harassing them.201 An injunction,
however, may not be as useful as it appears, especially for a woman
harassed by a private citizen she has only just met and will most
likely never see again. One can imagine a mother breastfeeding her
child on a park bench and being excoriated by a passerby for exercis-
ing her option to feed her child in such a manner. In this situation,
an injunction is neither timely nor appropriate, as it is unlikely the
passerby will ever have the opportunity to harass the mother again.
The option of an injunction, however, is better than no option of
remedy at all.
This Note proposes that Pennsylvania provide a remedy much
like those in the statutes of New York, New Jersey, or Vermont. Given
the conservative resistance to the original bill’s rights-granting lan-
guage, proclaiming breastfeeding a civil right in Pennsylvania, like
it is in New York, may be difficult. The simpler option would be to
194. Id.
195. Clark & Wohl, supra note 4, at 2.
196. See supra note 61 (describing the Leigh Bellini story).
197. Cruver-Smith, supra note 28, at 177.
198. Karen Springen, Indecent Exposure?, NEWSWEEK, 2007, http://www.newsweek
.com/id/34218.
199. Id.
200. Stauffer & Spinelle, supra note 68.
201. Marcus, supra note 47, at 51 (discussing Vermont’s statute).
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adopt a sentence like that in Maryland’s statute, prohibiting a per-
son from restricting or limiting a mother’s ability to breastfeed her
child in public.202 This language would clarify the purported intent
of Pennsylvania’s Act, and erase the confusion created by the “shall
be permitted” language by designating the specific actor to whom
the statute is speaking and specifying that actor’s responsibilities.
Since Senator Williams ran up against resistance due to political
worries about restricting the right of private property owners,203 an
amending legislator may again encounter resistance. Pennsylvania
could instead insert a section specifying fines to be levied against
people limiting a mother’s ability to nurse, but again, the question
of private property rights emerges. Language like that in Vermont’s
statute, which protects breastfeeding as part of its public accommo-
dations law,204 may ultimately be the best solution, especially since
Pennsylvania already has a public accommodations law in place.205
Whatever solution the legislature chooses, its passage will require
a significant amount of politicking and legislative haggling. As the
Freedom to Breastfeed Act currently stands, however, it only serves
as the legislature’s public recognition that breastfeeding is important
for both women and infants; it does little, if anything, to protect nurs-
ing mothers from harassment or restrictions in public.
CONCLUSION
Breastfeeding is one of the most intimate and instinctual acts
of motherhood, yet across the country, fewer mothers breastfeed their
children for extended periods of time. This is so even though both
the medical and sociological communities recognize breastfeeding’s
benefits for health and well-being. One of the most important rea-
sons for the drastic departure away from the breast and towards the
formula-filled bottle is the American culture’s over-sexualization of
the woman’s breasts and body. “ ‘We define breast-feeding as good,
and we define breast-feeding as disgusting. We have this split per-
sonality about it.’ ” 206 State legislatures have taken up the cause of
promoting the medical and monetary benefits of breastfeeding, as they
have realized that the only way to increase the rate of breastfeeding
is to make the communities comfortable with it again, and that
202. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-801(b) (West 2009).
203. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
204. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(j) (2009).
205. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-953 (West 2009).
206. Springen, supra note 198 (quoting Jacqueline Wolf, Associate Professor of the
History of Medicine, Ohio University).
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requires the protection of mothers who choose not to be secluded in
their homes for the duration of their natural, supportive choice.
Pennsylvania, in an attempt to support the Commonwealth’s
nursing mothers and shield them from unnecessary harassment, is
one of the latest states to finally pass a breastfeeding protection law.
While Pennsylvania’s Freedom to Breastfeed Act is commendable for
its first leap into the world of breastfeeding protection, it is an empty
law. It only gives women the permission to breastfeed in public; it
does not explicitly or implicitly give women the right to breastfeed
their children outside of their homes, as so many other states do.
Nor does the Act provide women with a legal remedy should their per-
mission to breastfeed be revoked by someone without the legislature’s
approval. If the Commonwealth truly wants to support its nursing
mothers and persuade new mothers to breastfeed for longer periods
of time, it must provide some sort of remedy for the inevitable situ-
ation when a mother is harassed at the shopping mall while sitting
discretely on a bench in the corner.207 A permission slip to breastfeed,
buried in the Commonwealth’s code books, does nothing to help these
mothers who are made to feel embarrassed and wrong through no
fault of their own, just because they have not been given the legal
tools to stand up for their right to nourish their children the best
way they can. Pennsylvania owes it to these mothers to step up and
truly support their breastfeeding efforts, instead of giving them an
empty statute and patting itself on the back.
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